ABSTRACT
The Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence has recently undergone a fundamental change. Both scholars and the Court have long recognized the Immunity Theory as the authoritative methodology for interpreting the Eleventh Amendment. But the Immunity Theory is not stagnant. It has evolved with the modern Court. Scholars have discussed the immediate results of this evolution by focusing on the fact that, through the modern Immunity Theory, state sovereign immunity has become a constitutionalized feature of this Nation's federalist system. That is, state sovereign immunity is now detached from the Eleventh Amendment's text, and appears to be a universal default absent affirmative destruction.
This academic focus has ignored what this Article explores: the modern Immunity Theory's evolving selection of analytical tools used to justify the scope and application of state sovereign immunity. The modern Immunity Theory now emphasizes constitutional structure and constitutional history to explore the boundaries of state sovereign immunity. This Article uses those tools to ascertain the correct bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's intrusion on state sovereign immunity. And the Fourteenth Amendment's impact on state sovereign immunity is unmistakable. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment extinguished state sovereign immunity. To the extent that a State violates the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment-be it the protections found within that Amendment, or the constitutional protections incorporated against states through the Fourteenth Amendment-such violations are unprotected by state sovereign immunity. A Section 5 enactment is not required to abrogate state sovereign immunity, because Section 1 has already eviscerated state sovereign immunity with respect to its provisions. Congress need only to create a right of action against the states to allow citizens to vindicate their constitutional rights.
INTRODUCTION
A group of Alabama Sheriff's Department employees subject a correctional officer to sex-based and race-based discrimination. 1 Alabama avoids all monetary liability despite any culpability for violation of the correctional officer's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 2 The Massachusetts sheriff's office and its officers knowingly deny an inmate medical treatment, resulting in the inmate enduring a month of intense pain and the potential loss of bone and teeth. 3 Massachusetts avoids all monetary liability despite any culpability for violations of the inmate's Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 Iowa State Patrol officers arrest protestors standing on a public street while simultaneously ignoring other individuals in the area who are vocalizing a different political point of view. 5 Iowa avoids all monetary liability despite any culpability for violations of the protestors' First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 6 These cases fall into an all too frequent fact pattern. A government actor violates an individual's constitutional rights. The wronged individual then seeks the society-approved method to make herself whole and right the wrong-a lawsuit. 7 The individual's right of action 8 against offending state civil rights litigation-it is a wall. 12 The prohibition is inflexible and practically absolute. And it undermines vindication of individuals' constitutional rights against infringing state sovereigns.
This Article contends that individuals should be able to bring constitutional tort suits against state sovereigns under § 1983-that is, suits for monetary damages against state sovereigns who violate an individual's constitutional rights. This argument is based on both constitutional law and statutory interpretation.
As to the matter of constitutional law, the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered this Nation's federalism structure. This Article explores how this change affected state sovereign immunity, and concludes that the states submitted their sovereign authority to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This conclusion diverges from Supreme Court precedent, which held that States relinquished their sovereign immunity to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The difference is more than academic. Section 5 provided Congress the power to enact legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the states submitted to this authority, then the resulting conclusion is that the states relinquished their sovereign immunity only to certain congressional legislation. In contrast, Section 1 created new, substantive constitutional rights. By submitting to this substantive provision, the states relinquished their sovereign immunity to those newly created constitutional rights-regardless of whether Congress enacts any Section 12.
Of course, the pitfalls underlying any civil rights claim are not limited to state sovereign immunity. For example, the "under color of" state law requirement precludes a § 1983 action against a defendant whose harm-causing conduct was entirely private and without a connection to the government. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) Another example is that a defendant cannot be liable for the actions of another, regardless of what relationship exists between the defendant and the harm-causing individual. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (" [W] e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."); see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1358 (2011) (holding that "the policymaker for the district attorney's office" could not be liable for another prosecutor's Brady violations without "actual or constructive notice of . . . a need for more or different Brady training"). The absence of respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions is not without critics. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (setting forth a multi-prong assault on the continued reliance of the Monell Court's rejection of respondeat superior liability); Donald L. Doernberg, Taking Supremacy Seriously: The Contrariety of Official Immunities, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 471 (arguing that the Monell Court's historical rationale is "highly questionable").
[Vol. 35 5 legislation. As a matter of the default status quo, then, the Fourteenth Amendment shifted the federalism balance of power by requiring the states to affirmatively surrender their sovereign immunity to the newly created constitutional rights, rather than relinquish their sovereign immunity in reaction to appropriately enacted law.
This leads to the matter of statutory interpretation. Section 1983 must be read against the background that no state sovereign immunity exists as against Section 1's substantive constitutional rights. In light of this absence of sovereign immunity, § 1983 must be read as authorizing suit against state sovereigns who violate an individual's constitutional rights.
Arriving at this conclusion requires engaging in the following analysis. Section I reviews state sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Section II shifts the focus to the relation between state sovereign immunity and federal constitutional rights-and specifically the Fourteenth Amendment-within the structure of the Constitution. At the end of Section II, it will be shown that States relinquished their sovereign immunity to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section III will then explain how the absence of state sovereign immunity against Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment requires allowing individuals to bring suit under § 1983 against States for violations of an individual's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
I. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE CONSTITUTION
Because this Article ultimately advocates for the reversal of Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 13 a review of that decision serves a logical starting point and directs the course of discussion.
Ray Will filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Michigan Claims Court alleging, in part, that he had been improperly denied a promotion by his state employer in contravention of the United States Constitution.
14 Will brought suit against multiple defendants, including the Michigan Department of State Police and the Director of State Police in his official capacity. 15 Will's case worked its way through the Michigan judicial system until it reached the Michigan Supreme Court. 16 The Michigan Supreme Court held that neither a State, nor a state official acting in their official capacity, is a person for § 1983 purposes. 17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
13.
Will, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); see also infra Part III. 14.
Will, 491 U.S. at 60.
15.
Id. at 60-61.
16.
See id.
17.
Id.
the widespread conflict on these points, 18 and thereafter affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court's holding. 19 The Court acknowledged that it was not clear, at the time Will brought his case before the Court, whether a State was subject to a § 1983 suit. Diversity Theory. The Diversity Theory rejects a purely textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and instead applies the Amendment to fewer situations than its text would suggest. 69 The Diversity Theory holds that reading the Eleventh Amendment in isolation from the remainder of the Constitution creates an "illogical" 70 and "unlikely result." 71 The incongruous result is that the Eleventh Amendment would allow for in-state citizens to bring non-diversity-jurisdiction suits (e.g., federal question) against a State, but would prohibit such non-diversity-jurisdiction suits for out-of-state and foreign citizens. 72 To avoid this inconsistency, the Diversity Theory therefore reads the Eleventh Amendment in conjunction with the terms of Article III to only prohibit cases against States that rely solely upon diversity jurisdiction. 73 The Diversity Theory has repeatedly persuaded a minority of Supreme Court Justices-but never a majority. 66.
Id.

67.
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 62, at 1838, 1875-76 (agreeing with the Compromise Theory's textualist interpretation by arguing that the Eleventh Amendment makes perfect sense "as written [,] if it is read against the backdrop of the Founders' deeply and widely held understanding that the Constitution did not authorize Congress either to enact legislation for states or to coerce state compliance with federal commands"); Andrew B. Further exploration of the Immunity Theory reveals an evolution in how the Immunity Theory analysis is applied.
C. THE MODERN IMMUNITY THEORY
Immunity Theory jurisprudence dates back to the Court's 1890 decision Hans v. Louisiana. 82 The Hans Court was confronted with an in-state plaintiff bringing a federal question suit against a State.
83 Rather than adhering to the Eleventh Amendment's text, the Court instead allowed "the force and meaning" of the Eleventh Amendment-the reversal of Chisholm-to dictate the application of the Eleventh Amendment. 84 This culminated in the Court's rejection of a plain reading of the Eleventh Amendment and application of the adopters' supposed intent: that the Eleventh Amendment extended to prohibit suits by in-state citizens. 85 The Hans Court thus kick-started the purposive application of the Immunity Theory. And some observers' assert that the purposivist underpinning of Immunity Theory is alive and well. 88 Accurately categorizing the interpretative method of Immunity Theory is certainly beyond the scope of this Article. It is, however, pertinent to note that the modern Court's constitutionalizing of state sovereign immunity 89 utilizes the structure and history of the Constitution to define the scope of state sovereign immunity. Whether this "structure and history" analysis can fall neatly within the purposivist paradigm is an interesting question, but not one to be resolved here.
Instead, what is important are these new methods of rationalizing state sovereign immunity under the Immunity Theory. Exploring the following three cases helps to not only flesh out the modern legal justification of Immunity Theory, but also outline the boundaries of state sovereign immunity. These cases also underscore the interplay between the modern Immunity Theory and Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which will become important later in the Article. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). To operate Class III gaming in compliance with the Act, the Seminole Tribe was required, in pertinent part, to conduct such gaming "in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . ." Id. at § 2710(d)(1)(C). In turn, this Tribal-State compact could be entered into after the Indian tribe requested negotiations with the State, during which the State was required to negoti-The Seminole Tribe Court's central focus was deciding whether Congress, under its Article I powers, could validly abrogate a State's immunity from suit in federal court. 92 Before answering this question, however, the Court addressed whether such state immunity existed from the type of suit at issue. 93 The Court easily resolved this antecedent issue. As the majority explained, over 100 years had passed since the Court first recognized that the Eleventh Amendment was not to be strictly construed. 94 Instead, the Eleventh Amendment confirmed a presupposition of this Nation's federalist structure: that each State is a sovereign, and inherent to such sovereignty was immunity from an individual's suit absent a State's consent. 95 Therefore, as established by precedent, the states retained immunity from suit brought by Indian tribes such as the Seminole Tribe. 96 The succinctness of this beginning point of the Court's opinion, which altogether ignored Justice Souter's attack on the Eleventh Amendment's presupposition, 97 underscored the Court's commitment to conceptualizing state sovereign immunity as a constantly present barrier requiring affirmative destruction.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
After moving to the main question-the scope of Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity-the Court transformed the commitment to state sovereign immunity into a constitutional principle. 98 The Court readily determined that Congress unmistakably made clear their intent to abrogate the states' immunity from suits under the Act. 99 But such intent to abrogate could be effective only if the Act itself was enacted pursuant to a congressional power that imbued Congress with the ability to abrogate.
100
On this point, two potential sources existed.
First Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as 'Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.").
145.
See id. at 713-30.
[Vol. 35 ment had simply been narrowly drafted to mend Chisholm's modest intrusion on the states' broad sovereign immunity.
146
Thus, the scope of constitutionalized state sovereign immunity is unrestrained by the Eleventh Amendment. 147 In fact, sovereign immunity is inherent to the states' status as sovereigns; the resulting conclusion is that state sovereign immunity exists regardless of the status of the plaintiff, the nature of the claim, or the location of the judicial forum.
148 When that conclusion could ever be adequately countered was left to be determined. Alden, 527 U.S. at 723 ("Congress chose not to enact language codifying the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity but rather to address the specific provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision.").
Central Virginia
147. 156 Instead, the Court's attention centered on an antecedent issue: whether the states relinquished their sovereign immunity to federal law enacted under the Bankruptcy Clause as part of the plan of the Constitutional Convention. 157 With the discussion thus framed, the Court's focus invoked the antecedent issues in both Seminole Tribe and Alden that questioned whether state sovereign immunity existed in the first place, 158 rather than whether Congress could abrogate such state sovereign immunity.
159
The Katz Court's opinion built upon itself in a streamlined manner to come to a single conclusion-that the states surrendered their sovereign immunity to the Bankruptcy Clause in the plan of the Constitutional Convention. 160 To this end, the Court shaped its discussion by using tools similar to those wielded by the Alden Court, including constitutional history, the purpose of the constitutional structure, and early practices. Compare id. at 362-63 ("The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was inserted in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted under its auspices immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena."), with Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . ."), and id. at 741 ("In determining whether there is 'compelling evidence' that [Congress has Article I authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court] is 'inherent in the constitutional compact,' we continue our discussion of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution.") (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)).
[Vol. 35 First, the Court determined that the Framers adopted the Bankruptcy Clause so federal uniformity would ameliorate the disjointed landscape of colonial and state bankruptcy laws. 162 Second, the Court recognized that bankruptcy's primarily in rem jurisdiction does not threaten state sovereign immunity. 163 But the Bankruptcy Clause encompasses more than in rem jurisdiction; it additionally includes ancillary orders implicating in personam jurisdiction, which potentially interferes with state sovereign immunity. 164 Third, in light of the above considerations and early congressional legislation, the Court held that the states agreed in the Constitutional Convention to relinquish sovereign immunity when federal bankruptcy proceedings conflicted with their immunity. 165 The Katz Court, therefore, accepted the modern Immunity Theory's legal justification 166 by accepting Seminole Tribe's constitutionalized state sovereign immunity 167 and Alden's expansion of sovereign immunity as a universal attribute of state sovereignty. 168 But in using the tools to determine the scope of Immunity Theory's constitutionalized state sovereign immunity, Katz discovered that such immunity is not without exception.
169
Seminole Tribe and Alden therefore provided the modern legal framework for analyzing state sovereign immunity, but Katz showcased that this framework is not without internal limits. 170 With this understanding of these three cases as a baseline, this Article now moves to establish another exception to the nearly universal attribute of state sovereign immunity: the states waived their sovereign immunity from suit for violations of the Federal Constitution.
162.
See 
II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Determining whether state sovereign immunity exists so as to bar a private suit involves multiple, sequential steps. The following outlines this logical sequence.
171
As an initial matter, the states, as sovereign entities, retained sovereign immunity before the Constitution's ratification, and such immunity remained attached to the states' sovereignty when they entered into this Nation's constitutional system. 172 However, this preexisting immunity did not survive to modern day without exception. These alterations to state sovereign immunity may have been carved out at two different points in time. First, a showing that the states relinquished their sovereign immunity in the plan of the Constitutional Convention will extinguish the existence of such immunity. 173 Second, even if the states retained their sovereign immunity as part of the Constitutional Convention, a constitutional amendment can remove such state sovereign immunity. 174 This Article contends that state sovereign immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits is nonexistent. The following is an analysis of this claim placed within the context of the structure of the above sequential analysis. This analysis not only will underscore precisely why such state sovereign immunity has been relinquished, but also will showcase why currently available methods of enforcing constitutional rights are inadequate.
171.
The However, before engaging in this analysis, it is pertinent to address a potential criticism regarding the value of such an exercise. This criticism might arise from normative judgments such as the premise that not every right must have a remedy, 175 or from the notion that the current methods of enforcing federal constitutional rights are perfectly sufficient.
176 This Article might therefore be construed as pointless at best, or a problematic attempt to undermine important federalism principles at worst.
The response to this criticism is twofold. First, this Article openly accepts the theory that every constitutional right deserves a remedy. 177 Though the state sovereign immunity slate is far from blank-and so doctrine cannot simply be written anew-this theory nonetheless is the underlying motivation for the Article to seek justifiable remedies under current doctrine. In this light, one need to only agree with the general philosophy that constitutional rights deserve remedies, rather than all rights must be afforded remedies at all costs.
178 From this position, one can easily sanction , has authority generally to grant such remedies as an injunction, or a judgment for possessory relief, or a judgment for damages, it must afford these remedies to the degree determined, ultimately by the Supreme Court, to be appropriate in implementation of the Constitution.").
178. Holding constitutional rights as having a constitutionally-motivated imperative of adjudication, and therefore being more important than other private rights, is a commonly-held perception of this Nation's constitutionalized government. See, e.g., Richard H. the following analysis of determining whether current jurisprudence supports a limiting of state sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional rights. Second, one need not be motivated by either constitutional rights or constitutional remedies to reject complacency with the status quo. The following analysis dovetails with a desire to ascertain an accurate understanding of state sovereign immunity's scope and boundaries under the modern Immunity Theory. Even if one accepts that the current state of affairs are desirable, that should not preclude ascertaining whether the legal landscape has shifted in light of the Supreme Court's evolution of legal principles.
Accepting that determining whether state sovereign immunity is inoperative against individuals' constitutional tort suits has normative value, the Article now turns to the sequential analysis.
A. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE STATES' PREEXISTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This stage of the analysis requires determining whether the states' sovereign immunity, existing prior to the ratification of the Constitution, was limited as against individuals' suits for the violation of a correlation to federal constitutional rights. This Article concedes that such suits were not carved out from the states' preexisting sovereign immunity. Thus, if States do not retain sovereign immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits, it is not because the states lacked such immunity before they entered into this Nation's constitutional system.
B. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE PLAN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
This stage of the analysis requires determining whether the states' sovereign immunity, once the states submitted to the plan of the Constitutional Convention, was limited by that plan as against individuals' constitutional tort suits. This Article accepts that such suits were not carved out from the states' sovereign immunity in the Constitutional Convention. an idea embedded deep in the history and structure of the American republic"). These commentators can be categorized as arguing that the states' surrender to the constitutional plan-and particular components of this Nation's government-compels concluding that States relinquished their sovereign immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits.
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Thus, if States do not retain sovereign immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits, it is not because the states relinquished such immunity in the plan of the Constitutional Convention.
However, it is important to address what portions of state sovereign immunity the Court has recognized as relinquished in the plan of the Constitutional Convention. This will inform the imperative of enforcing federal constitutional rights on a level that is meaningful to the injured individual.
The Constitutional Convention: Waiver of Immunity from Suits by the United States
The Constitutional Convention removed from the universal scope of state sovereign immunity the immunity from suits initiated by the United States. 180 This aspect was withdrawn from state sovereign immunity because the United States was the best entity to ensure individual states' compliance with obligations to both sister states and to the federal government, while also "forestall[ing] the United States' resort to extralegal measures." 181 Moreover, the United States has an independent interest in the enforcement of federal law, thereby allowing the federal sovereign to bring suit whenever an individual's federal constitutional rights are infringed. 182 This method to vindicate federal constitutional rights therefore appears as a viable avenue to ensure sufficient enforcement. 183 This is especially true if the federal sovereign may route monetary damages recovered from infringing States to constitutionally injured individuals. 184 Yet this waiver of immunity is actually of limited use to harmed individuals. A federal official's decision to file suit is made on a case-by-case basis, not subject to the individual's control, and influenced by considerations of resources, belief as to the merits, and political calculations. 185 The reliability of this option is therefore suspect and even if available, compensating the individual for her constitutional harm might be proven impossible. This method of enforcement is therefore insufficient to reliably compensate the wronged individual.
The Constitutional Convention: Waiver of Immunity from Suits by Sister States
The Constitutional Convention removed from the universal scope of state sovereign immunity from suits initiated by other States. 186 This was the result of a practical compromise creating an independent forum in which to settle disputes between otherwise coequal States 187 "as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union."
188
The same concerns relating to the reliability of federal enforcement of individual rights apply with equal force to States enforcing the rights of its own citizens against other States.
189 But a more fundamental problem exists. The Court has held that state sovereign immunity is fully functional when a State's suit actually seeks to recover from another State for the injuries to an individual. 190 dividual's claims is well established and recently affirmed. 191 This method to enforce individuals' constitutional rights against infringing States is therefore entirely unavailable.
C. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
This stage of the analysis requires determining whether the states' sovereign immunity, being affected by constitutional amendment, was limited as against individuals' constitutional tort suits. Making no further concessions, this Article argues that the Fourteenth Amendment disarmed the states of sovereign immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits. In this manner, this Article parallels the Katz Court: it accepts that the states entered into the Union with their sovereignty intact, and it avoids determining whether Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity.
192 But whereas Katz looked to the plan of the Constitutional Convention to ascertain whether state sovereign immunity ceased to exist, 193 this Article looks to whether the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered that plan so as to erase once-existing state sovereign immunity.
Using the same tools of constitutional history and structure that both the Alden and Katz Courts wielded, 194 this Article now explores the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 to the Fourteenth Amendment affords Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment Fundamentally Altered This Nation's Historical Structure of Federalism
196
Taken together, these two Sections of the Fourteenth Amendment had a profound effect on the structure of this Nation's federalism. Before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Federal Constitution was mainly concerned with the operation of, and limits of powers given to, the federal government. 197 For example, the governmental structure set forth in the Constitution 198 established a limited scope of the federal governmentleaving all other sovereign power to the states. 199 Exceptions did exist, as portions of the original Constitution applied directly to the states. 200 But for purposes most important to this Article, "the Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government." 201 States were simply unconstrained [Vol. 35
by the rights federal citizens were afforded against the federal government. 202 The Fourteenth Amendment changed that dynamic in two substantial ways.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes, by its very terms, direct obligations on the states. 203 States are affirmatively prohibited from engaging in conduct which would violate the protections of privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection. 204 And these obligations are more than a moral duty of the states-they are a constitutional imperative that Congress can enforce through appropriate legislation. 205 Second, the Fourteenth Amendment indirectly imposes obligations on the states beyond the terms of the text. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been read to include both a procedural and substantive component. 204. See Epps, supra note 201, at 898-99 (collecting Supreme Court authority whereby the express provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been held to limit the states' conduct).
205.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1879) ("The argument in support of the petition for a habeas corpus ignores entirely the power conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. Were it not for the fifth section of that amendment, there might be room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the State . . . . But the Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete."). certain Amendments of the Bill of Rights against the states.
207 Through these two avenues-direct obligations and indirect incorporation-the Fourteenth Amendment reshaped the historical structure of this Nation's federalism.
Indeed, comparing the disconnect between the Federal Constitution and the states prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, 208 to the enormous topdown intrusion on State autonomy that the Fourteenth Amendment heralded, 209 practically compels what the Court has repeatedly recognized: "that the Fourteenth Amendment . . . fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution."
210 What this Article now examines is just how this altered balance of power actually manifested in relation to state sovereign immunity.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Structural Changes Impacted State Sovereign Immunity
In one sense, the Fourteenth Amendment's direct obligations and indirect incorporation were themselves an alteration of the constitutional structure. 211 But this altered constitutional structure also extended to reconfiguring the boundaries of the states' constitutionalized sovereign immunity. This Section first discusses the Fourteenth Amendment's two judicially recognized restrictions on state sovereign immunity. It then turns to a limitation of state sovereign immunity currently unrecognized by the courts. 211. See Ho, supra note 207, at 373 ("Along with the other Reconstruction Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the balance of federal and state power by establishing broad constitutional protections for substantive rights against interference by state and local governments."). The Fourteenth Amendment created new restrictions on state action, so that the states could no longer operate in a manner that violated federal constitutional rights. 212 The Supreme Court has maintained adherence to the belief that the states will operate in good faith so as to not violate these obligations. 213 Yet despite the potential for good faith compliance, states frequently run afoul of these Fourteenth Amendment constraints. If state sovereign immunity prohibits individuals' suits to force states to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment, this conflict puts the supremacy of federal law in doubt.
The Court crafted its solution to this problem in Ex parte Young.
214
There, the Court distinguished between state sovereigns and individuals acting in their official capacity on behalf of the State. 215 Recognizing that a State has no power to sanction a violation of the Federal Constitution, the Court held that an individual acting in their official capacity, when violating the Constitution, is "stripped of [their] official or representative character" and therefore the State "has no power to impart him any immunity" from suit. 216 Regardless of this stripping of the individual's representative character, a suit against the official in the official's capacity is still a suit against the position itself-not an action against the individual in his personal capacity. 217 
212.
See relief that is available may only be prospective, 224 so that past infringement alone does not permit application of the Young doctrine. 225 And other doctrines, like standing, frequently limit the ability of individuals to bring suit to prevent such future harm. 226 Official-capacity suits therefore lack a real ability to compensate harmed individuals and ensure enforcement of constitutional rights.
Though not an intrusion on state sovereign immunity, it is pertinent to discuss litigation related to official-capacity suits: personal-capacity suits. When an official, acting as a state officer, violates the Federal Constitution, the injured party may file a suit against that official in his capacity as a private individual. 227 This has the effect of holding the official personally responsible for his illegal conduct, even though the official acted under color of state law. 228 Though these personal-capacity suits do not implicate state sovereign immunity, 229 such suits are another avenue for individuals to enforce their constitutional rights. Because personal-capacity suits permit monetary relief for constitutional infringement, the issue of state sovereign immunity appears to be very much beside the issue.
The problem with personal-capacity suits foreclosing a determination as to whether States should be liable for constitutional violations is twofold.
One issue is that personal-capacity suits do not mimic traditional private tort litigation by simply resolving the merits of a dispute. Private litigation frequently lacks immunities, 230 yet officials in their personal-capacity are afforded either absolute or qualified immunity. 231 To the extent absolute immunity is operative, the personal-capacity suit is completely barred. 232 Qualified immunity is always present in the absence of absolute immunity, 233 and has grown into a nearly de facto bar to recovery. 234 When evaluated in the context of actual litigation, the personal-capacity suit is in many ways merely illusory as a means to enforce constitutional rights and provide [Vol. 35 monetary relief. Another issue is that the personal-capacity suit focuses only on one particular wrongdoer: the individual. But it cannot be denied that the individual was acting as an agent for the State when the unconstitutional conduct occurred 235 -and under principles of liability, the State shares an equal portion of fault. 236 So even assuming that a personalcapacity suit is a feasible method to enforce constitutional rights, it fails to adequately account for all blameworthy parties by excluding the states from its scope. For these reasons, the potential for personal-capacity suits does not allow for sufficient enforcement of constitutional rights. 251 Moreover, even when state sovereign immunity permits individuals' constitutional tort suits, those methods of enforcement are deficient. 252 And alternative litigation fails to adequately remedy harm and hold States accountable for their wrongdoing. 253 In light of this rights-remedy gap, an imperative exists to ascertain whether the Fourteenth Amendment actually carved out from state sovereign immunity the immunity from individuals' constitutional tort suits.
Before analyzing the actual contours of the Fourteenth Amendment's impact on state sovereign immunity, preemptively defusing criticism sur-rounding the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose will clear the table. The Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment had an actual, substantive impact on this Nation's federalism structure. 254 It is possible that this alteration was not the intent or the purpose of either the Congress who proposed and debated the Fourteenth Amendment, or the states who ratified it. 255 As Professor Lash contends, after having studied the debates to the Fourteenth Amendment, no congressional member believed that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress . . . had [the] . Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.").
268. Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346.
269.
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 ("[I]n order that the national will, thus declared [in the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment], may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last section of the [A]mendment invests [C]ongress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition."); Rives, 100 U.S. at 318 ("Congress, by virtue of the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, may enforce the prohibitions whenever they are disregarded by either the Legislative, the Executive, or the Judicial Department of the State. The mode of enforcement is left to its discretion.").
270.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-20; see also id. 524-27. 271.
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346.
This conclusion follows from a close reading of Ex parte Virginia. There, the Court first explained that the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power." 272 The Court then turned to the enforcement provision of Section 5, but only to explain that the Constitution "empowered Congress to enact" laws to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 273 The Court then turned back to the substantive prohibitions against state conduct. The Court acknowledged that a State generally has the power to determine how jurors can be selected and state law may be administered, but that such authority is restricted by the Federal Constitution. 274 Thus, when authority is given to the federal government-that is, the limitation of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the ability to ensure enforcement of those limitations-a corresponding degree of state authority is carved out from the states' sphere of power. 275 The Court therefore determined that Congress could constitutionally enact a law penalizing the exclusion of a citizen on the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 276 But this legislation was not the source of federal authority that had a "corresponding diminution" of state power; 277 that source stemmed from the substantive prohibitions against the states.
278
This close analysis is important because when the Supreme Court finally evaluated the balance between the Fourteenth Amendment and state sovereign immunity, the focus was too much on the enforcement provision. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court framed the Ex parte Virginia's give-andtake between federal and state power as between "the expansion of Congress'[s] powers with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty . . . ."
279 Thus, it is Congress's enforcement powers that carve out the states' sovereign immunity; or, to put in other terms, state sovereign immunity is "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 280 This analysis is correct only insofar as the scope of Congress's powers of mere enforcement are defined by the limits of Section 1 to the Fourteenth Amendment. That is to say, Congress is afforded enforcement power under Section 5, but that power is a derivative of Section 1. It is Section 1 that empowers substantive federal rights and limits the states. The diminution of
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. state authority is therefore governed by the metes and bounds of Section 1.
To correct the Fitzpatrick Court would be to frame Ex parte Virginia's give-and-take in the terms of how expanding Section 1 federal power corresponds in diminishing state sovereignty. The conclusion that follows is not that state sovereign immunity is limited by Congress's Section 5 enforcement power, but Section 1's substantive authority. This shift in the locus of where in the Fourteenth Amendment state sovereign immunity is limited has practical effects. If Congress's affirmative power of enforcement does not include an ability to limit state sovereign immunity, abrogation-the power of Congress to extinguish sovereign immunity-is unavailable.
281 But Congress does not need such an ability to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, because those substantive provisions have, on their own force, restricted state sovereign immunity. In sum: Section 1 to the Fourteenth Amendment restricts state sovereign immunity, so that any legislation relating to Section 1 is unencumbered by such immunity.
III. REVISITING WILL V. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE
It is now appropriate to return to Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. 282 As previously discussed, the Will Court held that a § 1983 suit could not lie against a State because States were not "person[s]" under the terms of that statutory right of action. 283 But the rationales supporting this conclusion all arose from-or at least were related to-a respect for the presence of state sovereign immunity. 284 But state sovereign immunity does not exist with respect to conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 285 Therefore, the Will Court's respect for state sovereign immunity was misplaced to the extent a § 1983 action is brought against a State for violations of either the Fourteenth Amendment's direct obligations on the states, 286 or the Fourteenth Amendment's indirect incorporation of other individual rights against the states.
287
The Court should therefore revisit the Will holding. Amending that holding to reflect the structural change the Fourteenth Amendment had on [Vol. 35 state sovereign immunity can result in one of two outcomes. First, the Court can narrowly modify Will to hold that a § 1983 person continues to exclude States, except for when States are alleged to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This option has the benefit of being a more limited contravention of Will. Second, the Court can more broadly overrule Will by holding that a § 1983 person always includes States, but the states' sovereign immunity prohibits suit for conduct that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. This option has the benefit of ensuring uniformity of doctrine-so that the statutory interpretation of person is uniform, and the prohibition against some suits is directly based off of state sovereign immunity, in conformity with the Court's broad conception of such immunity under the Immunity Theory.
Regardless of which avenue the Court might choose, the end result must be the same-individual litigants must be able to bring suit against States under the § 1983 right of action for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
The Court has recently evolved the rationale for its Immunity Theory jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity. A shift away from merely citing purpose and towards using constitutional history and structure has invited review of the traditional understanding of state sovereign immunity's modern scope and limitations. Further, the limited ability for individuals to enforce their constitutional rights against infringing States counsels for renewed examination of state sovereign immunity under the modern Immunity Theory. This Article takes up this invitation by examining the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upon review of the Fourteenth Amendment and the earliest cases explaining that Amendment's impact on this Nation's federalism, this Article agrees with much of Supreme Court precedent. The Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the relationship between the federal sovereign and state sovereigns, as well as between federal citizens and state sovereigns. One particular manifestation of this shifted structure was an alteration to the state sovereign immunity set forth in the original plan of the Constitutional Convention.
But the Article breaks from precedent at this juncture. The Court has held that Section 5 to the Fourteenth Amendment-the enforcement clause-is the portion of that Amendment which subordinated state sovereign immunity. Contrary to this holding, this Article contends that state sovereign immunity was surrendered to Section 1 to the Fourteenth Amendment-the substantive provisions. Determining that the substantive rights of the Fourteenth Amendment were carved out from state sovereign immunity has a real impact when conceptualizing state sovereign immuni-ty: it simply does not exist as against Fourteenth Amendment rights. Congress need not legislate to abrogate such immunity; the Fourteenth Amendment itself is what has permanently "abrogated" state sovereign immunity.
In the absence of such state sovereign immunity relating to those Fourteenth Amendment individual rights, Will v. Michigan Department of State Police should be reconsidered. The Will decision held that States were not persons for purposes of § 1983 actions.
288 But this decision was molded by state sovereign immunity concerns. Revisiting that holding is essential, because state sovereign immunity is simply nonexistent against those constitutional rights sought to be vindicated in a § 1983 action (the direct obligations of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other rights incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment). In recognizing that such state sovereign immunity concerns are actually absent, and that state sovereign immunity cannot actually prohibit an individual's constitutional tort suit, the Court should hold that States are in fact persons under § 1983 for purposes of vindicating federal constitutional rights. 289 
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Notably, because the Fourteenth Amendment altered this Nation's constitutional structure regarding constitutional rights, § 1983 actions to vindicate statutory rights are still prohibited by state sovereign immunity.
